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I. INTRODUCTION
This year's survey of Florida law demonstrated a familiar pattern in
Florida evidence. Criminal evidentiary cases outnumbered civil evidentiary
cases almost four to one. Once again, hearsay was the predominant area,
with expert testimony and scientific evidence drawing the most divergent
opinions. A troubling theme throughout the survey period was the incredibly
high number of cases being reversed without timely objections being made
to the error. 1 The majority of these reversals occurred during closing
argument, although cases involving improper voir dire and opening statements also received reversals.2 The district courts seem intent on curbing the
unethical behavior of attorneys who use "scorched earth" tactics in the
presentation of their case to the jury.3 It appears that the appellate courts

1. See FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (1995). Section 90.104(1)(a) requires a timely objection in
order to preserve error for appeal. Id.
2. A few of the cases that have been reversed without objection are: Baptist Hosp., Inc. v.
Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversed for improper closing
argument, calling defendant's witnesses "idiots," referring to defenses as "unbelievable" as to
insult jurors, and including numerous other improper comments); Norman v. Gloria Farms,
Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversed for threat to jurors that a verdict
for opposing side would destroy jurors' lifestyles); Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So.
2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversed for improper closing arguments, including
personal opinion and comments which accused plaintiff of perpetrating fraud upon court and
jury).
Although an objection was made in Williams v. State, 673 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1996), the comment was deemed innocuous. This case was reversed due to an improper
comment which was made by the prosecutor during closing argument, wherein the prosecutor
stated: "'Isubmit to you that it's not reasonable to consider that sworn police officers, doing
their job, could come into court and perjure themselves."' Id. at 975. The district court felt
that this was improperly bolstering the credibility of the police officers. Id. However, this
was one of the more innocuous comments as compared to many other cases.
3. The district courts of appeal should be commended for attempting to stop this type of
in-court behavior, such as when attorneys call witnesses and other attorneys "liars," "scum,"
and other expletives too numerous to discuss. However, this praise is not without reservation.
It seems that there could be a growing trend toward "gotcha" trial tactics when one side is able
to sit idly by and make no objections and then complain for the first time on appeal that there
was error warranting a reversal. Section 90.104 of the Florida Evidence Code requires a
timely objection in order to preserve a point for appeal. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1)(a). The
district courts are unable to consider an assertion of error in the admission of evidence, made
in the trial court, if counsel fails to make a contemporaneous objection at trial. Only if the
error is fundamental should an appellate court consider the issue on appeal. However, the
Supreme Court of Florida has indicated that fundamental error should be found infrequently.
Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). As the supreme court stated: "The
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have had enough of attorneys "pushing the envelope" of unethical behavior
during trial.4 The Florida Legislature made no significant changes to the
evidence code this year. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida took up
the issue of DNA admissibility, and the district courts of appeal were
divided over the admissibility of child abuse profile evidence.5

II. OFFERS OF PROOF
One of the most important provisions in the FloridaEvidence Code is
the offer of proof provision in section 90.104.6 The importance of this
section cannot be overlooked if a chance at a successful appeal is being
considered. Section 90.104(1)(b) provides that when a trial judge erroneously sustains an objection, counsel must make an offer of proof of how the
witness would have responded if allowed to answer the question, in order to
preserve the point for appeal.7 An offer of proof may be made in the
following ways: 1) by having the witness answer the question on the record
out of the presence of the jury; 2) by including in the record a written
statement of the anticipated answer; or 3) by a professional statement of
counsel to the court divulging the answer which is made on the record. An
offer of proof permits the trial court to learn the answer of the witness to the
excluded question. An offer of proof gives the trial court the opportunity to
change its ruling and provides the appellate court the opportunity to properly
examine the full question and answer in determining if an error was made by
the trial court. If an appellate court has to speculate as to the answer to an
excluded question, it is unlikely that error will be preserved or found. 8
Appellate Court should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very

guardedly." Id
4. See Devlin v. State, 674 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Dauksch, J., dissenting), wherein the dissent reproduced a page of improper comments and stated that these
comments were inappropriate because they: "1) evoke sympathy for the state's witness; 2)
constitute an improper comment on defendant's right to remain silent; 3) shift [the] burden of
proof; 4) vouch for the credibility of the state's witnesses; 5) state the prosecutor's beliefs; 6)
disparage defense counsel; and 6) [sic] invade the jury's province." Id. at 798 (footnote
omitted). This case provides a plethora of improper and inflammatory comments that should
be avoided by counsel during trial.
5. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 671 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
6. FLA. STAT. § 90.104. This section is entitled "Rulings on Evidence."
7. Id. § 90.104(l)(b).
8. See Nava v. State, 450 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cause dismissed,508
So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1987). Section 90.104(1)(b) also provides that an offer of proof is not
necessary if the substance of the answer "was apparent from the context within which the
questions were asked." FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1)(b). However, counsel should never count on
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During the survey period, the Third District Court of Appeal addressed
the issue of how an offer of proof is made when the trial court excludes
documents from evidence. In Brantley v. Snapper Power Equipment,9 the
third district reversed the trial court's ruling, granting the defendant's motion
in limine, which excluded from evidence post-manufacture, pre-accident
notices, service bulletins, and correspondence on which the plaintiffs were
relying to prove the existence of a defect in a product.' 0 At the hearing on
the motion in limine, the plaintiffs made no offer of proof of the excluded
documents, nor were the excluded documents made part of the record at the
trial. Although the plaintiffs felt they were excused from making the
necessary offer of proof, the district court disagreed." The district court
stated:
When the trial court excludes evidence, an offer of proof is
necessary... if the claimed evidentiary error is to be preserved for
appellate review. This can be done without violating the order in
limine by offering the excluded documents at trial outside the presence of the jury. "Excluded documents ... should be marked for

identification with a number and described fully in the record. This
makes a record of the excluded evidence available to an appellate
court so it can determine if error was committed in excluding the
the appellate court's generosity in finding that an answer was "apparent" from the context of
the questions. A proffer should always be forthcoming. See Dale A. Bruschi, Evidence: 1992
Survey of FloridaLaw, 17 NOVA L. REv. 255, 257 (1992). This article provides additional

cases which discuss offers of proof in criminal and civil cases.
9. 665 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
10. Id. at 242.
11. Id. at 243. Apparently, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on Bender v. State, 472 So. 2d
1370, 1372-73 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that once the trial court has
excluded evidence pursuant to a pretrial motion in limine, the proponent of the evidence
should not attempt to elicit the testimony to preserve the error. Brantley, 665 So. 2d at 243.
Professor Ehrhardt, in his treatise on evidence, seems to agree with this position, in stating
that, "[s]ince the purpose of the motion [in limine] is to prevent a proffer of the evidence at
trial, a party who abides by the court's ruling should not be put in a position of waiver."
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENc E § 104.5, at 22 (1996) (footnotes omitted).

However, the Third District Court of Appeal in Brantley stated that Bender (also a Third
District Court of Appeal case) stands for the proposition that the proponent of the excluded
evidence should not violate the order in limine by offering the excluded evidence at trial in the
presence of the jury. Brantley, 665 So. 2d at 243 n.3. Bender does not preclude the proffer of
excluded evidence outside the presence of the jury. Id. The court felt that Bender proceeded
on the implied assumption that an adequate record of the excluded evidence had been made
during the motion in limine hearing. Id. However, where that has not been done, an offer of
proof must be made at trial. Id. Unless an adequate offer of proof has been made in the
motion in limine hearing, the necessary offer of proof must be made during the trial. Id.
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evidence and also makes it available for post trial motions." ...
Alternatively, if an adequate record of excluded evidence has been
made at the hearing on the motion
in limine, it is not necessary to
12
make an offer of proof at trial.
Naturally, the most prudent course of action, when a motion in limine
has been granted excluding evidence, is to make an offer of proof during the
trial. An offer of proof should still be made, outside the presence of the jury,
even if an adequate record was made at the motion in limine hearing. This
will give the trial court an opportunity to reconsider the ruling in light of the
changing dynamics of the trial.' 3 This procedure will also demonstrate to the
appellate court that trial counsel has not abandoned this matter and that the
trial court has remained steadfast in its determination to exclude the evidence.

IE[. SUMMING UP AND COMMENT BY THE JUDGE
During the survey period, one of the few cases that discussed trial
judges interrogating witnesses was reviewed by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal. In Moton v. State,14 the defendant appealed a trial court's conviction for armed robbery of a convenience store clerk.' 5 The defense at trial
was that the State had charged the wrong man. During the examination of a
key prosecution witness (the store clerk), the trial judge asked a series of
questions regarding the enclosure that separated the clerk from the shopping
area. The trial judge then inquired of the clerk where the defendant was
standing. 16 The defense timely objected to these questions.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the defendant that
questioning by the trial judge can, and often does, suggest to the jury that
some evidence may be more important than other evidence.17 This causes

12. Brantley, 665 So. 2d at 243 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
13. See Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
14. 659 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
15. Id. at 1269.
16. As can best be gleaned from the opinion, this was in an apparent attempt to clear up
some confusion regarding which individual the witness was referring to when he was
examining a group photograph (or videotape) which contained the defendant's picture.
17. Moton, 659 So. 2d at 1270; but see Williams v. State, 143 So. 2d 484, 488 (Fla.
1962) (holding that the judge is permitted to ask questions in order to clarify the issues but he
should not lean to the prosecution or defense lest it appear that his neutrality is departing from
center).
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the jury to focus on evidence it may not otherwise have strongly considered.
In Moton, the case was apparently a very close call, with the identification of
the defendant being a central issue in the case. 18 Because of the closeness
of the case, the district court was unable to find the questioning by the trial
judge harmless and reversed the case for a new trial. 19
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
In the case of Cordova v. State,20 the Third District Court of Appeal
wrestled with judicial notice in criminal cases.2 ' In Cordova, the defendant
was found guilty of indirect criminal contempt, for violating a domestic
violence injunction. 22 During the nonjury trial, the court took judicial notice
of the fact that the defendant had been served with a copy of the injunction.
The trial court based this, in part, on the stamped return of service for the
injunction.
The district court framed the issue to be "whether a trial court may
judicially notice the fact that a defendant was served with an injunction
where he is charged with indirect criminal contempt for violating its provisions. 2 3 The parties to the action agreed that notice of an injunction is an
essential element of the charge of violating its provisions.2 4
The district court noted that before the enactment of the evidence code,
judicial notice of a fact meant that it was taken as true without the necessity

18. Moton, 659 So. 2d at 1270. It appears that there was little other evidence, such as
fingerprints, etc., to tie the defendant to the crime. Thus, the case balanced on the credibility
of the eyewitness and his ability to make a positive identification of the defendant during an
emotionally charged few moments.
19. Id. The two concurring opinions make it clear that questioning by the trial judge,
though not specifically improper, is unwise. Justice Stone indicated that neutral questions by
the trial judge to "clarify the direction from which a photograph is taken or a diagram viewed,
or, as here, where a witness has referred to an individual on a videotape containing more than
one person in the picture and it is not clear to which individual the testimony refers," can be
helpful to the jury and the appellate court. Id. (Stone, J.,
specially concurring). However, a
judge travels a dangerous road in attempting to avoid the pitfalls associated with questioning
witnesses in front of a jury and, for the most part, should remain a neutral and impartial
mediator.
20. 675 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
21. M at 634.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. In criminal cases, the state must prove every essential element of the crime charged by
proof beyond a-reasonable doubt. Therefore, the analysis must be aimed at the effect the
judicial notice has on the state's constitutional burden.
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of offering evidence by the party who would do so.2 However, the rule did
not prevent an opposing party from introducing rebuttal evidence after a fact
had been noticed. Therefore, judicial notice served as prima facie evidence
of the fact so noticed.
When the evidence code was enacted in 1976, section 90.206 required
the trial judge to instruct the jury to accept as a fact, a matter judicially
noticed.2 6 A matter judicially noticed was meant to be binding on the trier of
fact, and no evidence disputing or rebutting the matter was permitted, once it
had been noticed by the judge.27 The mandatory "shall" section of the rule
was later changed to "may," and the provision now reads that the judge "may
instruct the jury during the trial to accept as a fact a matter judicially
noticed." 8 The district court found that the change now allowed the trial
court the discretion to determine whether taking judicial notice of a particular fact is conclusive as to that
fact, or whether the opposing party can
29
introduce conflicting evidence.
The district court examined the use of judicial notice in a criminal case
and noted that for a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to
operate within constitutional boundaries, "judicial notice should only be
used as a device to establish the prima facie existence of a particular fact
which the finder of fact is free to disregard despite the defendant's failure to
introduce evidence to the contrary." 30 The district court's main concern now
was whether the foregoing principles would apply in a case where the
defendant does not have a right to a jwry trial. The district court examined
the law regarding mandatory presumptions in making its determination and
stated:
Conclusive judicial notice not only establishes the existence of a
particular fact, it precludes the adverse party from introducing evidence to rebut it. Such a device would certainly run afoul of the
same due process rights implicated in the case of mandatory presumptions. Even in the case of a bench trial, judicial notice "must
not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a rea-

25. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 635 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.206 (West 1979) (Law
Revision Council Note-1976)).
26. Id. (citing EHRHARDT, supra note 11, § 206.1).
27. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.206).
28. Id. (quoting EHRHARDT, supra note 11, § 206.1).
29. Id.
30. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 635.
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sonable doubt." Accordingly, much like a permissive inference, a
constitutional use of judicial notice in a criminal case allows, but
does not require, the trier of fact to accept as true a fact so noticed. 3

Having determined that judicial notice of elemental facts in a criminal
case is constitutionally permissible, the district court turned its attention to
whether the judicial notice in this case was correctly taken.32 The trial court
took judicial notice under sections 90.202(11) and (12) of the evidence
code.33 The district court determined that these sections were inappropriate
for judicial notice of an injunction. 34 First, an injunction is not "'generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court."' 35 Judicially noticing
an injunction simply does not fit under this exception. Second, the district
court found that service of the injunction is not the type of fact that is not
subject to dispute because it is capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot be questioned.36 This section
was also improper for judicially noticing an injunction.37
Having determined that the injunction could not be judicially noticed
under the sections argued by the State, the district court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial court was right for the wrong reasons.3 8 The
district court found that the trial court could allow the State to use a permissive inference to establish the fact of service.39 "'A permissive inference
allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact
[service] upon proof of a basic fact [return of service] and places no burden
on the defendant." ' 40 The defendant would also be permitted to introduce
evidence to rebut these facts."'
31. Id.at 636 (citation omitted).
32. Id.
33. Section 90.202(11) of the Florida Statutes states, "[f]acts that are not subject to dispute because they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court." FLA.
STAT. § 90.202(11) (1993). Section 90.202(12) states, "[flacts that are not subject to dispute

because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot be questioned." Id.§ 90.202(12).
34. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 636.
35. Id.(quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.202(1 1)).

36. Id.
37.
38.
39.
40.
1996)).
41.

Id.
ld
Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 636-37.
Id.at 637 (alterations in original) (quoting Marcolini v. State, 673 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla.
Id.
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V. RELEVANT EVIDENCE
A. Computer Animations
During the survey period, an interesting case arose regarding the use of
a computer generated accident reconstruction animation to illustrate an
accident reconstruction expert's opinion. In Pierce v. State,42 the defendant
appealed from a conviction when he was found guilty of vehicular homicide
and leaving the scene of an accident, involving the death of a young girl.43
Eyewitnesses to the accident indicated that the vehicle which struck the child
was a Chevrolet Silverado truck with a camper top. At the scene of the
accident, the police investigators located a piece of a grille and a piece of
plastic from a turn signal lens. The medical examiner opined that there
might be a dent in the vehicle caused by the impact on the victim's head.
Three weeks after the accident, the police located the defendant's truck,
which had a dent where the hood meets the grille. Although this truck did
not have a camper top, neighbors stated that the defendant recently removed
the camper top from his vehicle.
The State Attorney's Office filed a Notice of Intent to offer computer
generated animation of its expert's accident reconstruction. 44 The State
intended to illustrate its expert's opinions of how the accident occurred
through the computer animation. The State's expert in accident reconstruction testified that the AUTOCAD computer program which was used for the
illustration was accepted in the engineering field as one of the leading
computer aided design programs. The expert's accident reconstruction
measurements were fed directly into the computer.
The State contended that the computer animation was a visualization of
its expert's opinion as to how the accident occurred. The State proffered the
computer animation as a demonstrative exhibit, to help its accident reconstruction expert explain his opinion to the jury, and as substantive evidence.
The trial court found the computer animation would express the expert's
opinion and was not a scientific or experimental test which would subject its

42. 671 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
43. Id. at 187.
44. Id. at 188.
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animation to the Frye test.4 5 The trial court also ruled
that the computer
46
animation could not be used as substantive evidence.
Demonstrative exhibits may be used during a trial as an aid to help the
jury understand a material fact or issue. A demonstrative exhibit must be an
accurate and reasonable reproduction of the object involved. This is the
same foundation that must be established for any photographic evidence,
such as a videotape, motion picture, or photograph. However, before
admitting the computer generated animation, the proponent of the evidence
must first establish the foundational requirements necessary to introduce an
expert opinion. 47
Any preliminary facts constituting the foundation for the admissibility
of evidence must be proven to the court by a preponderance of the evidence,
even in a criminal case.48 In Pierce, the appellate court found that the trial
court made the appropriate findings of preliminary facts, supported by
evidence introduced at the pretrial hearing.4 9 The expert was found to be
qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction and his opinion as to how
the accident occurred was applied to evidence offered at trial.50 The data the
expert relied on in forming his opinion was of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field. 5' Finally, the trial court specifically found that the
computer animation was a fair and accurate depiction of the expert's opinion
as to how the accident occurred and that the expert's opinion and the
computer
animation would aid the jury in understanding the issues in the
52
case.
45. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Tests such as DNA or blood
splattering are subject to the Frye analysis to determine whether they are accepted in the
scientific community.
46. Pierce,671 So. 2d at 188.
47. The foundation requirements for expert testimony are: 1) the opinion evidence must
be helpful to the trier of fact; 2) the witness must be qualified as an expert; 3) the opinion
evidence must be applied to evidence offered at trial; and 4) pursuant to section 90.403 of the
Florida Statutes, the evidence, although technically relevant, must not present a substantial
danger of unfair prejudice that outweighs its probative value. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1995).
See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), cause dismissed,
507 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987). Another foundational requirement is that the facts or data relied
on by the expert in forming the opinion expressed by the computer animation must be of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject area. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1995).
48. Pierce, 671 So. 2d at 190 (citing CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 105.1
(1995)).

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id.
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B. Bolstering Witness Credibility
In Smith v. State,53 the district court reversed the conviction of a New
Smyrna Beach police officer who was found guilty of lewd and lascivious
assault upon a child under the age of sixteen years.54 The district court
reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court committed reversible
error.55 The trial court erred by allowing the victim's mother to testify that
the victim never made false statements against anyone,56and for allowing the
State's expert witness to bolster the victim's credibility.
The testimony at trial indicated that the defendant was a twenty-fouryear-old police officer. He met the victim through her boyfriend, who was a
police explorer. A short time after, the victim tried to commit suicide. The
defendant befriended the victim and her mother and acted as a counselor to
the victim. After getting to know the child and his mother, the victim would
go to the defendant's house to watch Music Television ("MTV"). It was
during one of these visits, that the defendant allegedly fondled, caressed, and
had intercourse with the victim, which was consensual. After intercourse,
the defendant allegedly told the victim to keep it a secret because he was
twenty-four and she was fourteen and, as a police officer, he could get into
trouble.
The victim allegedly told her best friend about the incident and some
weeks later, she told her mother about the sexual relationship. The mother
reported the allegations to the police. The crime was reported approximately
one month after it occurred, and the police could not obtain any medical or
physical forensic evidence to corroborate the child's testimony. The only
direct evidence was the child's testimony and hearsay statements. This
testimony was contested by the defendant, who testified that the victim had
been to his house, but they did not have sex.
During trial, the State offered the testimony of the victim's mother and,
over defense objection, elicited from the mother that the victim had never
"'made any false criminal allegations against anyone else.' 57 This was
error.58 The victim's credibility was a crucial factor in the case, since no
medical or physical evidence corroborated the victim's testimony. 9 Allow53. 674 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

54. Id. at 792.
55. Id. at 794.

56. Id.at 793.
57. Id. (citation omitted).

58. Smith, 674 So. 2d at 793.

59. Md
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ing the mother to testify that the child never made false statements against
anyone was extremely prejudicial, unnecessarily bolstered the credibility of
the victim, and was improper character evidence.60
The district court also found that testimony from the State's child abuse
expert was reversible error. 61 The State's expert testified that most sexual
abuse victims come from single parent households, that children who were
previously sexually abused were at a greater risk of being abused a second
time, and that this victim was sexually abused by the defendant. Evidence at
trial indicated that the victim's parents were separated, that the victim lived
with her mother, and that the victim had been previously sexually abused.
The district
court found that admission of this testimony was reversible
2
6

error.

The district court distinguished Glendening v. State,63 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida held that it was not fundamental error to allow a
child abuse expert to testify that the child had been abused. 64 However, in
Glendening, the child was three and one-half-years-old at the time of the
abuse, which would make it difficult for the child to describe the incident.
Here, in Smith, the victim was fifteen years of age. Additionally, the
expert's testimony in Glendening was limited to and supported by a recorded
"doll interview" which was played for the jury.
The district court noted that in the present case, the State's expert
provided no support for her opinion that the victim had been abused 5 The
State's expert testified regarding the numerous child abuse cases she worked
on and testified that she reviewed the child's deposition and her statements
to the police and victim's advocate, but she did not give any foundation in
science, or any other area of specialized knowledge, to support her belief
that the victim had been abused.66 The district court found that with no
foundation for this belief, "the expression of this belief amounted to no more
than an impermissible comment on the credibility of the child." 67 Additionally, the district court noted that, unlike the expert testimony in Glendening,

60. Id. The district court indicated that the defense did not attack the victim's character
relating to truthfulness or put the child's character or reputation at issue. Id. Therefore, the
testimony was not admissible under either section 90.609(2) or 90.404(l)(b). Id.
61. Smith, 674 So. 2d at 794.

62. Id.
63. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989).

64. Id. at 220.
65. Smith, 674 So. 2d at 793.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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the State's expert testimony in Smith was not helpful to the jury, since the
child in this case was fifteen-years-old and fully capable of describing what
happened.68 The testimony by the State's expert that she believed the
defendant abused the child is a classic example of irrelevant and impermissible evidence. Testimony regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused is
value of the testimony is
almost always inadmissible because the probative
69
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The district court also examined the logical relevance70 of the expert's
statistics regarding abused children. The State's expert stated that most
abused children came from single family homes and that children who have
been previously abused are at a greater risk of being abused a second time.
The district court questioned how these statements, or statistics, make it
more likely than not that a crime was committed against this victim and/or
that the defendant committed the crime.71 Conversely, if the evidence was
presented to demonstrate the propensity on the part of a child to be victimized, the district court found it to be impermissible character evidence.72
VI. IMPEACHMENT
During the survey period, a rather novel piece of impeachment work
was discussed by the Third District Court of Appeal in Little Bridge Marina,
Inc. v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc. 7 3 In this case, the plaintiff appealed from an
adverse final judgment in a breach of contract action. 74 Since each party
disputed the facts upon which the case was based, the trial centered around
the question of credibility of the main witnesses on each side.
At trial, defense counsel questioned the plaintiff about being an attorney. Defense counsel's cross-examination in this area ended with the
following question: "In fact, the type of law you did you represented crimi68. Id.
69. See FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1995). This section is titled "Exclusion on Grounds of
Prejudice or Confusion." See also Glendening, 536 So. 2d at 221.
70. Evidence should always be examined from the standpoint of whether the evidence is
logically relevant and whether the evidence is legally relevant. Logical relevance is simply
whether the evidence will make a fact in issue more or less probative. Evidence is examined

for legal relevancy to determine whether another rule of law excludes the evidence even if it
proves a fact in issue. For a thorough explanation of logical and legal relevancy, see Dale A.
Bruschi, Evidence: 1990 Survey of FloridaLaw, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1131, 1136 (1991).
71. Smith, 674 So. 2d at 794.
72. Id.
73. 673 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
74. Id. at 78.
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nals. You got them off. '75 It is presumed that defense counsel felt this
impeachment was a rather brilliant tactic. However, as pointed out by the
district court, and probably by defense counsel's trial advocacy professor,
this was patently improper.7 6
The resolution of the case depended upon the jury's view of the
credibility of the parties' account of the facts. The district court found that it
was reversible error to allow the trial attorney to use the plaintiff's past
career as a criminal defense attorney as impeachment.77 The district court
went on to say:
These statements by appellee's attorney were not only inappropriate, but they were also legally immaterial and irrelevant to the case.
Furthermore, the statements cannot be condoned by this court as a
form of impeachment. Clearly, these recriminations were intended
to denigrate the witness, Mr. Gustinger, in the eyes of the jury by
inflaming the jury against Mr. Gustinger based on the sentiment
held by many laypersons in the community to the effect that attorneys are not to be respected.78
The district court found the statements to be even more damaging, since
the credibility of the witness was critical, as it was the primary testimony to
be measured against the testimony of the appellee. 79 The district court also
noted that the cross-examination did not attempt to demonstrate that the
witness had done anything wrong, but was merely done to establish that the
witness was a criminal attorney and was meant to lower the jury's opinion of
the witness. Since the outcome of the case hinged on the credibility of the
witnesses, the improper impeachment destroyed the plaintiff's opportunity
for a fair trial.8'

75. Id. at 79.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Little Bridge Marina,673 So. 2d at 79 (citations omitted).

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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VII. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

A. Scientific Evidence
In Hayes v. State,8 2 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed, for the first
time, the admissibility of DNA evidence in a criminal trial.8 3 The facts in
Hayes revealed that a female groom at the Pompano Harness Track was
murdered in her dormitory room. Crime scene investigation found the victim
on the floor wearing only blue jeans and a T-shirt. A tank top shirt was
found lying nearby on the floor. The victim was clutching a piece of brown
hair. Seminal fluid was found on the tank top, the blue jeans, and in a
vaginal swab taken from the victim. Robert Hayes, another groom who
worked at the harness track, was arrested for the murder.
In addressing the issue of the admissibility of DNA evidence, the
Supreme Court of Florida made it clear that Florida utilizes the Frye test8 4 to
determine the admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence.8 5 A fourpart inquiry must be addressed by the trial court before expert opinion
testimony will be admitted at trial.8 6 First, the expert testimony must assist
the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in
issue. 7 Second, the scientific principle or discovery must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the scientific field in which
it belongs.88 Third, the expert witness must be qualified to present evidence
on the subject in issue.8 9 Fourth, expert opinion must be presented to the
jury. 9°
The Supreme Court of Florida earnestly examined the report on DNA
standards and methodologies drafted by the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences. 91 The report explains that in applying

82. 660 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1995).
83. Id. at 259.
84. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
85. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 262.
86. See Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida utilizes
the Frye test to determine the admissibility of new or novel evidence, such as DNA evidence).
87. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 262.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
(1992). This report and the full language of this case should be meticulously studied by
anyone who will be the proponent of DNA evidence or who will be defending against DNA
evidence.
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the Frye test to DNA testing procedures, there are four pertinent assumptions.92 Though all four of these assumptions are important, the Supreme
Court of Florida focused on the second and fourth assumptions.93 The
second assumption concerned the reliability of the underlying theory
regarding "correcting for band shifting. ' 94 The fourth assumption concerned
the proper procedures that must be followed for DNA evidence to be
admissible.9 5
In the Hayes case, the DNA test on the tank top was inconclusive.
However, after the prosecution's expert witness applied the controversial
"band shifting" technique, a three band match was found with samples taken
from the defendant. The defense challenged the expert on the "band shifting" technique, claiming that a three band match was not truly a match. The
defense also claimed that any corrections that were made due to "band
shifting" were not accepted in the scientific community. The supreme court
examined the findings of the National Research Council and agreed with the
Council's report that "[uintil testing laboratorieshave published adequate
studies on the accuracy and reliability of such corrections, we recommend
that they adopt the policy of declaring samples that show apparent band
shifting to be 'inconclusive.' 96 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida
found that the test on the tank top was unreliable.97
The Supreme Court of Florida next examined the DNA test done on the
vaginal swab taken from the victim. 98 There was a seven band match on this
sample. The supreme court felt that this DNA evidence could not be
excluded as a matter of law. 99 However, the supreme court also believed that
it could not approve this evidence for admission at this juncture, since it
properly applied, as suggested in the
found that the Frye test was not °°
National Research Council's report.'
In summarizing its findings, the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
92. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 91, at 133-34.
93. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 263.
94. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 9 1, at 133-34.
95. Id. Even if proper procedures are followed, the probative force of the evidence will
depend on the quality of the laboratory work.

96. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting
supra note 91, at 60-61).

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

SCIENCES,

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The supreme court suggested that the vaginal swab DNA evidence could be
presented by the State if the methodology utilized by the technician in performing the test met
the requirements of the Frye test. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264.
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[W]e find that the DNA evidence would assist the jury in this case
in determining a fact in issue. We take judicial notice that DNA
test results are generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community, provided that the laboratory has followed accepted testing
procedures that meet the Frye test to protect against false readings
and contamination. With regard to the tank top, we find that the
DNA test was inadmissible because it did not meet accepted scientific principles. Finally, we find that, while this record does not
support a proper application of the required Frye test to the procedures utilized to obtain the DNA test results on the vaginal swab,
the DNA evidence may be presented upon retrial subject to a
proper finding under the Frye test.101
B. Testimony by Experts
During the survey period, two district courts of appeal 0 2 wrestled with
the dilemma of whether the Frye'0 3 standard should be applied to testimony
of a psychologist that the alleged victim in a child sex abuse case exhibits
symptoms consistent with those of a child who has been sexually abused.
This is commonly referred to as the "child abuse profile."
The child abuse profile arises when an expert in the area of psychology
gives an opinion that the victim in a child abuse case fits within the profile.
Naturally, in child abuse cases, there are no eyewitnesses, and the evidence
generally comes down to the statements of the child victim and, in some
cases, the protestations of innocence by the defendant.1°4 However, the
addition of a psychological expert testifying that the child victim fits within
the profile of an abused child, or that the child victim's case is consistent
with that of other abused children, tends to bolster the credibility of the
child's story. This is generally to the detriment of the defendant, who may
be claiming that another individual abused the child.
Syndrome testimony has been difficult for the Florida district courts of
appeal to interpret due to the divergent opinions rendered by the Supreme

101. Id. at 264-65.
102. Beaulieu v. State, 671 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Hadden v. State,
670 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
103. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
104. This is so often the case because there is generally no objective physical evidence of
the abuse which may have occurred months or years before.
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Court of Florida in the last few years.' 0 5 The inconsistency is due in part
because the court in Flanagan v. State'°6 held that "profile" evidence is
inadmissible because it does not meet the Frye test. 0 7 However, the court in
State v. Townsend,108 apparently relying on the relevance standard of section
90.702,09 held that "if relevant, a medical expert witness may testify as to
whether, in the expert's opinion, the behavior of a child is consistent with
the behavior of a child who has been sexually abused.""O
The First District Court of Appeal in Hadden v. State,"' attempted to
harmonize these cases by intimating that Flanagandealt only with new and
novel scientific profiles, which requires a Frye analysis." 2 Townsend, the
Hadden court surmised, recognized that evidence which is not new or novel
and which has been received in cases under the 3more relaxed relevancy4
standard, does not have to meet the Frye standard." In Beaulieu v. State,"
as well as in Hadden, the issue was the admissibility of the child abuse
syndrome, or child abuse profile. Both courts reasoned that this evidence
had been admissible in a number of cases and was, therefore, no longer new
and novel and subject to Frye. 1 5 However, the issue remains whether the
Supreme Court of Florida follows the view that the child abuse profile need
not be subjected to a Frye analysis. The Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Beaulieu was so perplexed that it stated: "Because Flanagan did not
mention Ward or Kruse, Townsend did not mention Flanagan,and Ramirez
...did not mention Townsend, who can tell? ' 116 Both courts certified the

105. State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827
(Fla. 1993); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907
(1989).
106. 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
107. Id.at 829.
108. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
109. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1993). This section is entitled 'Testimony by Experts."
110. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 958.
111. 670 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
112. Id. at 82. The Hadden court felt that new and novel scientific profiles included
pedophile and child sex offender profiles. Id.
113. Id. at 82.
114. 671 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
115. Id. at 809; Hadden, 670 So. 2d at 82. See also Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
116. Beaulieu, 671 So. 2d at 809 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). See Ramirez v.
State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995) (establishing a four-step process under section 90.702 in
order to determine the admissibility of a new or novel scientific principle; one such step
requires a Frye analysis); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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issue to be of great public importance,1 7 so a decision clearing up this
quandary should be forthcoming from the Supreme Court of Florida in the
coming year.
C. Basis of Expert Opinion
In a lengthy personal injury case, the First District Court of Appeal
examined the use of expert testimony relative to the seat belt defense.
Although no startling evidentiary issues are present, the case does elaborate
on the use of expert opinions and the facts which experts rely on in forming
their opinions.
Houghton v. Bond' 8 is a classic case of an attorney stepping over the
bounds of proper trial advocacy and pushing the limits of ethical behavior." 9
A head on collision was the impetus of the Houghton case. Mr. Houghton,
the single occupant of his vehicle, was killed in the accident. The driver of
the other vehicle was the plaintiff, Mr. Bond, who was not wearing a
seatbelt. Mr. Bond was seriously injured in the crash. However, his passenger, Mr. Lindsay, was wearing a seat belt and walked away from the accident
with only superficial injuries.
The two main contentions at trial were who caused the accident, and the
seat belt defense. The plaintiff's expert on accident reconstruction opined
that Mr. Houghton was partially in Bond's lane when the accident occurred.
The plaintiff's expert was not qualified to render an opinion regarding
seatbelts and offered no crash test testimony.
The defendant's expert was qualified at trial as an expert on accident
reconstruction, occupant kinematics, and biomechanics related to an automobile seat belt restraint system in a motor vehicle involved in a crash. The
testimony from the defendant's expert dealing with accident reconstruction
demonstrated that the vehicle in which Bond and Lindsay were riding drove
off the shoulder of the road, and Bond over-corrected and swerved across the
center line of the highway into the path of Houghton's vehicle. 20
In examining the use of a seat belt in this accident, the defense expert
opined that had Bond been wearing his seatbelt, the forces he experienced
and injuries he sustained would have been less than or, at most, equal to

117. Beaulieu, 671 So. 2d at 811; Hadden, 670 So. 2d at 83.
118. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1067 (1st Dist. Ct. App. April 24, 1996).
119. The district court points out these shortcomings in a sharply written opinion that is
recommended reading for anyone interested in doing trial work.
120. Apparently, the jury was convinced by the defendant's accident reconstruction expert, as the verdict was clearly in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
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those sustained by Lindsay. 12 1 The defense expert also testified regarding
government crash test data on cars including head injury criteria. This
material was important because had Bond been wearing a seatbelt, the
defense expert contended, the forces inside the car during the collision
would not have been sufficient for him to sustain a serious head injury.
The jury returned a verdict, finding that Bond was eighty percent
responsible for the collision, and ninety percent of Bond's injuries resulted
from his failure to wear a seatbelt. Therefore, Bond's damages of
$3,000,000 were reduced to $60,000.122 Bond's counsel filed post-trial
motions for a new trial and directed verdict. Bond's counsel also filed
affidavits contesting the defendant's expert's opinions. The purpose of these
affidavits was
to contradict and discredit portions of the defense expert's
testimony.12 3
The trial court inexplicably granted the plaintiff's motions and allowed
the plaintiff's attorney to "draft a detailed order that makes specific reference in the record to the testimony necessary to support the court's order on
appeal."' 124 This order granted Bond's post trial motion 1for
directed verdict
25
and struck the defendant's seatbelt defense in its entirety.
121. Lindsay walked away from this accident with only superficial injuries. The plaintiff,
Bond, on the other hand, was not expected to live, since his injuries were so severe when he
was brought to the hospital. Both Lindsay and Bond were riding in the same vehicle. This is
a pretty clear indication that seatbelts should always be worn and the seatbelt defense should
be used to properly apportion those damages associated with not wearing one.
122. Mr. Houghton sustained damages of $472,000 which was reduced by twenty percent
to $377,600.
123. How the attorney determined this was proper is hard to say. The district court was
unable to find any authority to support this action. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1069.
Since the plaintiff's attorney did not assert any of the grounds laid out in the affidavits prior to
or during trial, he cannot seek a reversal of the judgment now. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 619 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
124. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1069.
125. Id. The district court's review of this order is some of the more interesting reading
that will be found in an appellate opinion and is recommended reading for those who do not
wish to be embarrassed by the appellate court for inappropriate behavior. The district court
stated:
Notwithstanding Bond's counsel's commitment to the trial court to make
"specific reference in the order to the testimony necessary to support the court's
order" if permitted to draft a "detailed order," the order entered contains no such
references. Indeed, the order primarily reflects counsel's rather generalized disdain for both Dr. Benedict and his testimony, which was underscored at one
point during the proceedings below when counsel advised the court that
"Benedict is the source of my irritation" and referred to him later as the actor/witness Benedict.
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The district court reversed the order and in doing so, specifically
addressed the issue that the defense expert's use of government conducted
crash tests rendered him a conduit for inadmissible hearsay evidence.1 26 The
district court first pointed out that no objection was made to the use of the
governmental data during the testimony. 27 The district court went on to find
that the defense expert used the crash data to determine the speed of the
vehicles involved in this accident.128 Naturally, the government crash test
data does not in and of itself have to be admissible for the expert's opinion
to be admissible. 29 "The court concluded that the testimony aided the jury in
understanding the defense
expert's opinion, and was not a conduit for
30
evidence.
inadmissible
Id. at D1070 (emphasis added). The trial court order went on to find that there was no
plausible basis for the jury finding that ninety percent of plaintiff Bond's injuries were caused
by his failure to wear an available seatbelt. The district court naturally disagreed with this
finding, and stated, '"he record contains more than ample evidence to support this finding
quite apart from Benedict's apportionment testimony." Id. (emphasis added). This district
court went on to state:
Given the appealed order's reliance on Bond's counsel's personal opinions
regarding Dr. Benedict's "demeanor", "custom" and "habit" to support striking
the seatbelt defense, we have carefully plumbed the record to find support for
what have becomefindings by a stroke of thejudicialpen. Our independent research has failed to turn up the "testimony necessary to support the court's order"
as promised by Bond's counsel, which seems to us a reasonablypredictableresult when counselfor one of the parties to a holly contested lawsuit requests and
is permitted to prepare a dispositive order in that litigation without judicial
guidance of record and counsel's work product is uncriticallyaccepted and entered as submitted. If, for example, as the order finds, Dr. Benedict's
"performance on the stand" was more a debate with counsel than a proper attempt to answer the questions posed by bond's counsel, such was due in no
small measure to the tenor of counsel's often argumentative and sarcasticquestioning of the witness.
Id. (emphasis added).
126. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1070.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Section 90.704 of the FloridaStatutes provides:
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be
those perceived by, or made know to, him at or before the trial. If the facts or
data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the
opinion expressed, thefacts ordata need not be admissible in evidence.
FLA. STAT, § 90.704 (emphasis added). See also EHRHARDT, supra note 11, § 704.1; Barber v.
State, 576 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
130. The district court also found that whether a defendant is obliged at all to present
expert testimony in support of a seatbelt defense appears to depend upon the nature of the
plaintiff's injuries. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1071. The rule appears to be that in
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VIII. HEARSAY
A. Nonhearsay
Occasionally, a poor argument in the trial court and a cold transcript
read by the district court leads to a poor opinion. In Aneiro v. State,13 1 this is
apparently what happened. The defendant, Aneiro, was convicted of
trafficking in cocaine.132 The issue for appeal was whether the trial court
improperly admitted hearsay testimony of a taped telephone conversation
between the confidential informant ("CI") and the defendant. 133 The
defendant argued entrapment at trial and testified that the CI induced him to
deliver cocaine in return for $200 and the use of the CI's car for fifteen days.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's convic134
The exact sixteen word conversation that caused this reversal is as
tion.
follows:
[CI]: What kind of car will you be in?
[Appellant]: A Nissan.

[CI]: A Lincoln?
135
[Appellant]: Gray. A gray Nissan.
The district court found this to be inadmissible hearsay because it was
offered to prove that the CI did not know what kind of a car appellant would
use to transport the cocaine.' 36 The prosecution used this conversation in
closing argument to demonstrate that the CI had no knowledge of the type of
certain cases, such as those involving non-impact sprain/strain or orthopedic injuries (e.g., a
herniated disc), the party offering a seatbelt defense is required to present expert testimony,
because the precise cause of the plaintiffs injury (i.e. whether the injury would have occurred
had the plaintiff worn his seatbelt) is not within the province of the jury. Id. at D1 071.
131. 674 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
132. Id. at 913.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Please pay close attention to the punctuation used by the district court and reprinted in the opinion, as this will offer a clue as to the correct analysis of this matter.
136. Aneiro, 674 So. 2d at 913. From the meager facts presented, the best that can be
discerned is that the defendant was claiming that the CI entrapped him and, accordingly,
wanted to show that the CI did know what type of car the defendant would bring the cocaine
in, in order to prove that the CI gave him the car as an inducement to bring the cocaine. The
prosecution used this taped telephone conversation to argue, in closing, that the CI had no
knowledge of the type of car the defendant would be in and this would thus demonstrate to the
jury that the defendant's argument, that the loan of the car was an inducement for the drug
transaction, was untrue. This is, of course, a guess based on what few facts were given.
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car the defendant was in, and in turn, used this to demonstrate that the
defendant's argument that the deal was induced, in part, by the loan of a car,
was untrue. 137 If the defendant was not induced into the deal, in part, by the
loan of the car, then there may be no entrapment. Arguably, if the CI had to
ask what kind of car the defendant would be in, this would rebut the defense
that he lent the defendant the car, and therefore, entrapped him.
The district court of appeal rejected the State's argument that this
conversation constituted "verbal acts" and was not hearsay.138 This was
probably due to two separate things. First, the prosecution made no argument in the trial court that the hearsay was merely verbal acts. 3 9 It was
argued for the first time on appeal. Second, the conversation was used by
the prosecution to demonstrate the truth of the statements.
The district court rejected the plethora of case law which held that
verbal acts evidence is admissible in these types of cases because the
statements serve to prove the nature of the act.14° The dissent written by
Judge Shahood is the better analysis;14 1 however, the opinion can also be
upheld on two different analyses. First, reciprocal conversations between
two individuals, one of whom is an opposing party in a case, is generally not
hearsay. All the statements made by the party against whom the statement is
being offered is simply admissible as a statement of a party opponent under

section 90.803(18) of the evidence code.142 Questions by the other individu-

137. Apparently, at the trial, the prosecution failed to make any arguments that this statement was simply not hearsay, as the district court pointed out that this was argued for the first
time on appeal. Id. at 914. Additionally, no objection was made and no limiting instruction
for the hearsay statement was requested by the defense when the prosecution argued about the
type of car the defendant would be in. This was a nice job of finding error, when there was no
objection to the use of this closing argument by the defense, no limiting instruction was
requested, and there was no finding that the error was fundamental.
138. Id.
139. However, this could be of no real importance, because evidence admitted by the trial
judge for the wrong reasons will not cause a reversal if there were proper grounds to admit the
evidence. Irving v. State, 627 So. 2d 92, 94 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an
appellate court will not reverse when the trial court reaches the right result for the wrong
reason); see also Belvin v. State, 585 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Additionally,
a conviction should not be reversed unless the admittance of the evidence deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.
140. Aneiro, 674 So. 2d at 914. See Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 882 (1982); Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957); Decile v. State, 516 So. 2d
1139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McPhadder, 452 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), quashed,475 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1985).
141. Aneiro, 674 So. 2d at 915-16 (Shahood, J., dissenting).
142. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(a) (1995).
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als are simply not hearsay because they are not within the definition of
hearsay. Generally, only a "declaratory" statement can be considered
hearsay. Interrogatory, imperative, or exclamatory statements are not within
the definition of hearsay because they are not statements of opinions or facts
similar to a declaratory statement.1 43 Therefore, the questions by the CI,
asking what kind of car the defendant would be in, should 44not be considered
hearsay, since they are not declarations of opinion or fact.'
The statement could also be considered nonhearsay because it was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but was relevant for the following
reasons: 1) to demonstrate that the defendant engaged in the conversation
with the CI and took part in plans to supply illegal drugs; 2) to demonstrate
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the CI; and 3) to rebut the defendant's entrapment claim. 45 The statement is not needed to prove that the

143. See United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that while
an "assertion" is not defined in the FederalRules of Evidence, the term has the connotation of
a positive declaration); Lark v. State, 617 So. 2d 782, 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the defendant's statement to police investigator, "Who shot Wes Butler?" was
not hearsay. "We find that Lark's query was not an oral assertion."). See also Olin G.
Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the FederalRules of Evidence, 61 TEx. L. REV. 49,
73 (1982), which provides: "[A] verbal expression is hearsay only if it is (1) a declarative
sentence (2) the terms of which 'affirm positively, assuredly, plainly or strongly,' the matter
that it is offered to prove." Id. Since generally, only declarative statements can be considered
hearsay, a question to someone should not fall within the definition of hearsay.
144. Whenever a statement is entered into evidence as nonhearsay and therefore, not for
the truth of the matter asserted, a limiting instruction can be requested that the truth of the
matter not be argued to the jury. That limiting instruction was apparently not requested at the
time of the entry of the statement, nor was an objection or a limiting instruction requested at
the time the statements were used in closing argument. A contemporaneous objection is
needed to preserve an issue for review. FLA. STAT. § 90.104. There was none here.
Therefore, this issue should not have been heard, let alone used to reverse a conviction.
145. See Warner v. Walker, 500 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
hearsay statements concerning purported drug use by custodial parent's new husband was
admissible for limited purpose of showing child's knowledge of drugs); City of Miami v.
Fletcher, 167 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that proof that a statement was
made was relevant to show knowledge of dangerous condition). Although the defendant
allegedly borrowed the car from the CI, it was unusual that the defendant did not make some
inquiry when the CI asked what type of car the defendant would be driving. One would think
that the defendant would say, "Hey, what do you mean, what kind of car am I in, I'm in your
car." Therefore, maybe it could also be argued that the failure to correct this inconsistency or
the defendant's silence demonstrates the defendant's knowledge of the ownership of the car
and rebuts his assertion of entrapment. The defendant's silence in the face of this unusual
question might be considered an adoptive admission under section 90.803(18)(b). Under
limited circumstances, a party's failure to deny a statement made by a third party will give rise
to the inference that the party's silence is an admission of the truth of such statement (i.e. that
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defendant was really in a gray Nissan, but to prove the lack of knowledge of
the type of car that defendant was driving (i.e. it is not proving the truth of
the matter asserted, that defendant drove a gray Nissan, but the fact was
relevant to prove the lack of knowledge on the CI's part and used to rebut
the defendant's entrapment argument). Therefore, the statements were
properly admitted; the dissent was correct, and this case was improperly
reversed.
B. PriorInconsistentStatements as Substantive Evidence
In a very important hearsay case for prosecutors and defense attorneys,
the Supreme Court of Florida used some fancy footwork and circuitous
reasoning to conclude that a prior inconsistent statement' 46 that is taken as
part of a discovery deposition, pursuant to rule 3.220147 is not admissible
under section 90.801(2)(a), as substantive evidence. This case will, unfortunately, only add to the complexity and problems associated with criminal
depositions, as the high court obfuscates the true meaning of a trial as a
"search for the truth."
In State v. Green,148 the defendant appealed from a trial court's convic49
tion of sexual battery and lewd, lascivious, and indecent assault on a child.'
The fourteen-year-old child was also mildly retarded. In a defense deposition, the child victim implicated the defendant with statements about specific
sexual offenses he had committed upon her. At trial, however, she recanted
these earlier accusations. During the trial, she accused another man as the
person who forced her to have sex. The prosecution used section
90.801(2)(a),1 50 the victim's prior deposition testimony taken under oath, to
the CI did not know what type of car the defendant would be in because the CI did not lend
him his car). See Daughtery v. State, 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Johnson
v. State, 249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
146. Section 90.801(2)(a) of the FloridaStatutes, provides in part:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement
is:

(a) Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition.
STAT.
§ 90.801(2)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
FLA.
147. FLA. R. CPdM. P. 3.220(h).
148. 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995).
149. Id. at 757.
150. The prosecution also utilized section 90.803(23), the child hearsay exception, to
elicit from the victim's sister and sister-in-law the accusations the victim had related to them
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impeach the
witness' testimony, and used these statements as substantive
5'
evidence.1
A very divided First District Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's
conviction.1 52 The district court found that the deposition statements were
admissible as substantive evidence, pursuant to section 90.801(2)(a). 153
However, that evidence standing alone was insufficient to convict the
defendant, because the only evidence that the
54 defendant had committed a
crime was that single out-of-court statement.
The Supreme Court of Florida began its analysis with the interpretation
and use of section 90.801(2)(a).155 Prior to the adoption of the Florida
Evidence Code, t56 prior inconsistent statements could never be admitted as
substantive evidence. The adoption of the Florida Evidence Code allowed,
for the first time, the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence.
In Moore v. State, 57 the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the words
"other proceedings" found in section 90.801(2)(a) to mean Florida grand
jury proceedings. 58 The supreme court found that since section 90.801(2)(a)
was patterned after Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,159 and the
federal rules were interpreted to include grand jury proceedings, prior
inconsistent statements made in a Florida grand jury proceeding came within
the confines of section 90.801(2)(a).1t The Supreme Court of Florida in
concerning the defendant. These statements were allowed after extensive findings of
reliability by the trial judge.
151. Statements taken pursuant to section 90.801(2)(a) can be used for impeachment and
for substantive evidence. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a). See EHRHARDT, supra note 48, § 801.7;
Bruschi, supra note 70, at 1162.
152. Green, 667 So. 2d at 758.
153. Id.
154. Id. See State v. Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986) (holding that prior inconsistent
statements standing alone are insufficient for a criminal conviction).
155. Green, 667 So. 2d at 758 (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a)).
156. The effective date of the Florida Evidence Code was July 1, 1979 for criminal actions and was applicable to all civil actions pending on or brought after October 1, 1981.
157. 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1984).
158. lad at 562.
159. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1).
160. Moore, 452 So. 2d at 562. Florida and federal grand jury proceedings rarely have
opposing counsel available to cross-examine or ask any questions of the witnesses. It is
generally the prosecution presenting the evidence to the grand jury and questioning the
witnesses without any questions from an opposing viewpoint. The grand jurors can ask
questions; however, they are not in an adversarial position. It seems incomprehensible how a
grand jury proceeding, which includes only one side, the prosecution, could produce more
trustworthy and reliable evidence than a criminal deposition with both sides, the defense and
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Green concluded that federal interpretations of the rule could not be utilized
in this instance because Florida discovery rules regarding depositions are
61 regarding depositions. 162
much broader than Federal discovery rules
Therefore, no meaningful interpretation of a federal precedent could be used.
In Green, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure have two types of depositions available in
criminal cases. First, depositions which are taken to perpetuate testimony
brought under rule 3.1900) and second, depositions
which are taken for the
63
purpose of discovery brought under rule 3.220(h).1
Depositions under rule 3.1900) are taken for the specific purpose of
entering the deposition at trial in a criminal case for substantive evidence.
This is similar to Rule 1.330 of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure.164 The
key here being that under either situation, subject to objections, the deposition can be read to a jury as substantive evidence. 165 The Supreme Court of
Florida found that depositions taken pursuant to rule 3.220 are for discovery
purposes only and:
How a lawyer prepares for and asks questions of a deposition witness whose testimony may be admissible at trial as substantive evidence under rule 3.190 is entirely different from how a lawyer prepares for and asks questions of a witness being deposed for discovery purposes under rule 3.220. In effect, the knowledge that a
deposition witness's testimony can be used substantively at trial
may have
a chilling effect on a lawyer's questioning of such a wit166
ness.

the prosecution, in attendance and asking questions. The supreme court's ruling that criminal
depositions under rule 3.220 were not intended to qualify as substantive evidence under
section 90.801(2)(a) flies in the face of logic and reason. What raises testimony given in a
grand jury proceeding to the level of being trustworthy and reliable, with only one side present
and asking questions, above a criminal deposition with both sides present and the witness
answering both sides' questions under oath? This is illogical, at best, and unsound and
inconsistent reasoning, at worst.
161. Federal criminal discovery rules generally do not allow depositions of witnesses,
unlike Florida's discovery rules, which allow depositions in criminal felony cases, and for
good cause, in criminal misdemeanor cases.
162. Green, 667 So. 2d at 759.
163. Id.
164. FLA. R. Civ. P. § 1.330.
165. Green, 667 So. 2d at 759.
166. Id. It seems what the Supreme Court of Florida is saying between the lines is that
since 90% of depositions in criminal cases are taken by the defense, the defense attorney
would not ask a question that would incriminate his client, for fear that this could be used as
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The only use of rule 3.1900) is to perpetuate testimony. It is generally
used by the prosecution, when securing the witness at trial would be impossible. The most common use is when the witness will not be alive for the
trial. The prosecution moves to perpetuate the testimony and then the whole
deposition can be read to the jury. The cross-examination by the defense
attorney can also be read to the jury and all testimony is subject to objections. In reality, this section operates similarly to Rule 1.330 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. The prosecution does not perpetuate testimony in
anticipation of a deposed witness changing his testimony and neither does
the defense. 67 Nevertheless, based on this court's ruling, it would be wise

substantive evidence at trial, if the witness recanted his or her testimony. This is absolutely
absurd and flies in the face of the main tenet of what a trial is all about, a "Search For The
Truth." This search is aided by the evidence code, which assists the court and attorneys in
presenting only trustworthy and reliable information to the trier of fact. Testimony given
before a grand jury with only one side present is simply not more trustworthy than evidence
given before two adversarial opponents. It is illogical and irrational to believe otherwise. We
devised an adversarial system of justice, and that wonderful engine called cross-examination,
to seek out and find the truth. It is the common belief of many jurors and lay people alike that
the courts and attorneys do not present them with all the evidence. This is probably a true
statement when cases such as this fly in the face of logic and reason.
The logic which the supreme court uses is that an attorney in a discovery deposition would
be less likely to ask certain questions because of the chilling effect on the lawyer's questioning
of the witness, if the testimony could be used substantively at trial. This is absolutely absurd
and if you apply this logic to a grand jury proceeding, you are faced with the unpleasant
conclusion that the prosecutor will only ask the witnesses questions which would be favorable
to getting an indictment. This clearly does not bolster the trustworthiness or reliability of the
statements made at a grand jury proceeding. Therefore, it is fallacious reasoning at best to
assume that a grand jury proceeding falls under the ambit of section 90.801(2)(a), and is
therefore considered reliable and trustworthy evidence, but a criminal deposition taken under
oath and with two adversarial opponents questioning the witness, is not sufficiently reliable
and trustworthy.
The witness is under oath and is subject to perjury; why are these safeguards included in a
discovery deposition? Why not just take an unsworn statement? It makes no sense. If the
statement falls within the evidence code, it should come in at the trial.
167. However, it is apparent that in child molestation and rape cases, the prosecution
should move to perpetuate testimony under rule 3.1900). Rule 3.190(j)(2) specifically allows
for a deposition of this sort:
If the defendant or the state desires to perpetuate the testimony of a witness
living in or out of the state whose testimony is material and necessary to the
case, the same proceedings shall be followed as provided in the preceding subdivision, but the testimony of the witness may be taken before an official court reporter, transcribed by the reporter, and filed in the trial court.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900)(2) (emphasis added). Additionally, rule 3.1900)(1) states that
perpetuation is desirable if the witness is outside the jurisdiction of the court or may not be
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for both the defense and prosecution to only take depositions under rule
3.190 of material witnesses, for fear that if the witness changes his or her
testimony at trial, the advocate will not be able to impeach the witness and
argue the statement as substantive evidence.
In criminal cases, discovery depositions cannot be read to a jury as
substantive evidence, as in civil cases.1 68 However, a deposition, whether
taken in a civil or criminal case, should be allowed in evidence if the
testimony falls within the ambit of the FloridaEvidence Code. The purpose
of the evidence code in the search for the truth is to filter out unreliable and
untrustworthy evidence and to only allow that testimony which is trustworthy and reliable to go to the trier of fact. There is no logical basis for
disallowing evidence, which clearly falls within the ambit of the evidence
code, based on whether the deposition is offered in a criminal or civil case.
Professor Ehrhardt, in his treatise on Florida evidence, points out that:
the only depositions that are admissible [in criminal cases] are
those taken to perpetuate testimony in compliance with Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.1900). Thus the admissibility of a discovery
deposition under the Evidence Code differs depending on whether
There appears
the deposition is offered in a criminal or civil case.
69
to be no logical reason to draw the distinction.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that "all present rules
of evidence established by case law or express rules of court are hereby
superseded to the extent they are in conflict with the code."' 170 The rules of
criminal procedure determine the admissibility of deposition testimony and
were established by an express rule of the court. When the evidence code
able to attend trial and "the witness's testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take the
deposition to prevent afailureofjustice." FLA. R. ChuM. P. 3.190(j)(1) (emphasis added).
168. In civil cases, it is important to remember that a discovery deposition can be read to
the jury under two circumstances: 1) the deposition falls within the guidelines of Rule 1.330
of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure;or 2) the deposition is admissible under the Florida

Evidence Code (i.e. it is relevant and an admission of a party opponent). It is important to
keep in mind that under either scenario, the deposition still cannot be read if it does not meet
the prerequisites of the evidence code. For example, simply because the deposition fits within
rule 1.330, it does not mean it can all be read to the jury. Only the relevant and material parts
can be read. Likewise, simply because parts of the deposition can be read under the evidence
code, it does not mean that double hearsay given in the deposition can be read to the jury,
unless each part of the hearsay has an exception.
169. EHRHaRDT,supra note 11, § 804.1.
170. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.), clarified, 376 So. 2d 1161
(Fla. 1979).
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was adopted, it superseded any case law, or rules of court, which were in
conflict with the code. 17 1 If the criminal rules of procedure limit the use of
depositions as evidence, thereby operating as a rule of evidence, they have
been superseded by the Florida Evidence Code to the extent the criminal
rule of procedure conflicts with the evidence code. Therefore, section
90.801(2)(a) controls, and that part of the deposition which was inconsistent
with the victim's trial testimony should have been admissible as substantive
evidence.
The supreme court's statement in Green that, "[tlo permit the use of
rule 3.220 depositions as substantive evidence would discourage and chill
the use of discovery depositions and would limit the criminal pre-trial
discovery process"' 172 is unreasonable and illogical. The simple and limited
use of inconsistent statements in a criminal discovery deposition as substantive evidence will in no way limit or chill the criminal pre-trial discovery
process. The reliability and trustworthiness of testimony gathered in a
criminal discovery deposition and the way a criminal discovery deposition is
taken and utilized by both sides will not change in any manner. Any
contention otherwise simply demonstrates the lack of understanding between
our appellate judiciary and the day-to-day work of those trial attorneys for
the prosecution and the defense who toil in the criminal justice system.1 73 A
trial is a search for the truth. The evidence code should perpetuate that goal
and not subvert it in an attempt to place form over substance.
C. ChildHearsay Statements
In A.E. v. State,'7 4 the defendant appealed an adjudication which
declared the defendant delinquent, for committing a sexual battery upon a

171. Id.
172. Green, 667 So. 2d at 759.
173. Green is another tough case making bad law. The supreme court was clearly concemed that the victim was retarded, had accused other individuals of the crime, and that a
conviction based solely on the prior inconsistent statements of the victim would create too
great a risk of convicting an innocent accused. These sentiments are significant in the court's
determination of this case. However, the admission of the statements under section
90.801(2)(a) as substantive evidence would not have changed the outcome of the court's
ruling, since inconsistent statements standing alone are insufficient as a matter of law to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986). Therefore,
the district court of appeal's finding, that the testimony from the deposition was admissible as
substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a), should have been upheld by the supreme
court.
174. 668 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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five-year-old girl. 175 The defendant had a non-jury trial and the State called
three witnesses to testify regarding out of court statements made by the child
victim. The victim's statements to each witness included specific allegations
of the sexual battery and an identification of the defendant as the perpetrator.
The State introduced the statements pursuant to the applicable section
90.803(23) of the FloridaStatutes.176 This section authorized the introduction of hearsay statements of the child victim, if the statements are shown to
be trustworthy and reliable. 177 The defense objected to the admission of the
statements under the child hearsay exception, since the trial court did not
make specific findings of fact on the record as to the basis for its ruling. At
the conclusion
of the trial, the defendant was found guilty and adjudicated
178
delinquent.
On appeal, the defendant maintained that the trial court erred by not
179
making the requisite findings of facts as required by section 90.803(23)(c).
The State conceded that the trial court did not comply with the statutory
prerequisites, but argued that there was no reversible error because the
requirement of the statute pertains only to jury trials.180 However, no
authority for this proposition was cited by the State or found by the appellate
court. In fact, contrary to the State's assertion, if the trial court intends to
use the hearsay evidence as a basis for its ruling in a nonjury trial, then it
must support the use of the hearsay statements, by demonstrating that the
prerequisites for the hearsay evidence have been complied with.18 1 In this
way, the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence will be met.
175. Id at 705.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1993).
177. Id. Section 90.803(23) provides that out of court statements made by a child victim
with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of eleven or less, describing any act
of sexual abuse, are admissible if the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicate trustworthiness, and if the court finds that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. Id.
Subsection (c) of the statute directs the trial court to make specific findings of fact on the
record as to the basis for a ruling under this subsection. Id. § 90.803(23)(c).
178. A.E., 668 So. 2d at 705.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. This proposition is probably easier to understand by viewing another hearsay exception. If the court used an excited utterance, under section 90.803(2), as a basis for its ruling,
yet the prerequisites for an excited utterance were not met, i.e. the statement was not made in
relation to a startling event, while the declarant was under the stress of excitement, then the
statement may not be trustworthy, because there is room for reflective thought and fabrication.
If the trial judge used a hearsay statement, which may have been a fabrication, and therefore
untrustworthy, as the basis for his ruling, without other substantiating evidence, the ruling
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If there is other evidence, notwithstanding the hearsay evidence, then
the trial court's ruling might be sustained. However, the appellate court
noted that "[t]he child never testified concerning penile penetration, and
therefore, in an effort to establish the elements of the offense, the state
necessarily relied upon the hearsay evidence regarding the child victim's
out-of-court statements. 1' 8 2 If the trial court relied on the hearsay statements, and the prerequisites were not met, the conviction could be based on
unreliable and untrustworthy evidence. This is insufficient for a conviction.
The district court concluded that based on the evidence presented at trial, the
lower court must have relied on the hearsay evidence in finding the defen83 Therefore, the district court vacated the defendant guilty as charged.1
1 84
conviction.
dant's
D. Statements Against PenalInterest
In Jones v. State,18 5 the Supreme Court of Florida examined the use of
hearsay statements against penal interest,186 in denying a convicted killer's
motion for post conviction relief.187 On May 23, 1981, a police officer was
shot in his squad car in Jacksonville, Florida. Officers investigating the
scene learned that the shots had been fired from a nearby apartment complex. Upon investigating the complex, the police came upon the defendant
and his cousin in their apartment. During a cursory search of the apartment,
the officers found several high-powered rifles in plain view. Later, the
could be in error. It could be based on unreliable, untrustworthy, and essentially, inadmissible
evidence.
182. A.E., 668 So. 2d at 706.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 678 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1996).
186. Section 90.804(2)(c) of the FloridaStatutes provides in part:
(2) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS.-The following are not excluded under s.
90.802, provided that the declarantis unavailableas a witness:
(c) Statement against interest.-A statement which, at the time of its making,
was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended
to subject the declarant to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, so that a person in the declarant's position would not have made
the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the
statement.
FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
187. Jones, 678 So. 2d at 315.
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defendant confessed and signed a statement incriminating himself and
exonerating his cousin. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial and
sentenced to death.188
The defendant filed numerous motions for post-conviction relief,
claiming newly discovered evidence. During an evidentiary hearing on his
last motion for post-conviction relief, the defendant claimed that another
individual, Glen Schofield, confessed to the murder of the police officer.
The trial court excluded the confession of Schofield at the hearing. The
defendant argued that Schofield's confession was admissible, and the trial
court erred because the alleged confessions were declarations against penal
interest.
The supreme court began its analysis by stating that for a statement
against penal interest to be admissible, section 90.804(2) requires a showing
that the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 18 9 The party seeking to
introduce a statement against penal interest, in this case, the defendant, has
the burden of establishing the unavailability of the declarant. 190 The su191
preme court determined that the defendant did not carry this burden.
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution stated that Schofield was
available to testify. However, the defense refused to call him and instead,
stated to the court that Schofield would merely take the stand and deny that
he confessed to the murder of the police officer. 92 The supreme court aptly
stated that:
Contrary to Jones' attorney's position, we do not know what
Schofield would have said had he been called as a witness. The
burden was on Jones to establish that Schofield was unavailable
and Jones failed to meet that burden. Consequently, we find that
Schofield's alleged confessions are not admissible under 193
the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule.

188. Id. at 310.
189. Id. at 313.
190. Id. at 314.
191. Id.
192. Apparently, the defense attorney handling the post-conviction hearing spent much
time in preparation and in finding witnesses and newly discovered evidence. It is a shame the
same attorney did not spend the time to learn that merely stating that someone will change his
or her testimony is insufficient. It is also a shame that the attorney did not read the evidentiary
rule regarding the unavailability of witnesses, especially when the party is the proponent of the
evidence.
193. Jones,678 So. 2d at 314.
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The supreme court went on to find that the defendant also had the
burden of presenting corroborating circumstances demonstrating the trustworthiness of Schofield's confessions.' 94 The supreme court did not reach
the determination of whether the defendant carried this burden,
since the
95
defendant did not demonstrate that Schofield was unavailable.
This case is a good reminder that attorneys who attempt to use any
hearsay exception in section 90.804 must carry the burden of demonstrating
that the declarant is unavailable. Otherwise, the evidence will be inadmissible. Additionally, for statements against penal interest, attorneys have the
burden of presenting corroborating circumstances that demonstrate t96
the
trustworthiness of the statements they wish to admit under this exception.
The Supreme Court of Florida again addressed the admissibility of the
declaration against penal interest hearsay exception in Farinav. State.197 In
Farina, two brothers were convicted of the fatal shooting of a seventeenyear-old employee of a Taco Bell restaurant and sentenced to death.' 98 On
appeal, Anthony Farina argued that he was denied a fair trial when incriminating statements of his co-defendant brother were offered against him at
trial. 199 The State contended that the co-defendant's taped conversations
194. Id.; see also United States v. Seabolt, 958 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 971 (1993) (holding that statements by one criminal to another is more likely to be
jailhouse bragging than a statement against penal interest). The holding in Seabolt is a strong
reason why other corroborating circumstances must be present before a statement against
penal interest will be considered trustworthy enough to be admitted into evidence.
195. Jones, 678 So. 2d at 314.
196. The supreme court also went on to examine this case from the perspective of
whether the statements were admissible under due process principles enunciated in Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Jones, 678 So. 2d at 314. The supreme court in Jones
distinguished Chambers, finding that at the time Chambers was decided, Mississippi did not
have a hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest; however, Florida did have
such a rule in place at the time of Jones' trial. Id. Additionally, the court found that the
alleged confessions in the present case did not have the persuasive assurances of trustworthiness that was present in Chambers. Id. Therefore, Chambers is distinguishable and the
statements are not admissible under due process principles. Id.
197. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S176 (April 18, 1996).
198. Id. at S176.
199. Id. at S177. This occurs when there is a joint trial of two defendants. The codefendants cannot be called to the stand by one another. This would violate their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the statements entered by the
State against one defendant and admissible under the evidence code against that defendant
may not be admissible against the other co-defendant. This is especially true when the
statement or confession incriminates the other co-defendant. This would violate the codefendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. This is generally
called a "Bruton violation" after Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), cert. denied,
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were properly admitted as statements against penal interest pursuant to
section 90.804(2)(c) of the FloridaStatutes.20
Although the statement may be properly admissible as a statement
against penal interest, 20 1 the problem occurs when the co-defendant's
statement or confession incriminates or implicates another defendant and is
admitted during their joint trial. 20 2 However, the United States Supreme
397 U.S. 1014 (1970). In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated when a co-defendant's confession is
admitted at the joint trial, despite the fact that the jury is instructed that the confession is
admissible only against the co-defendant. If the statement is independently admissible against
the co-defendant, then he cannot complain that his confrontation rights were violated.
Hearsay falling within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception" is presumptively reliable and bears
sufficient indicia of reliability. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). However, even if
hearsay evidence does not fall within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception" and is thus
presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes, it may
nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a showing of
particularized guaranties of trustworthiness. Id. at 66.
200. Farina,21 Fla. L. Weekly at S177 (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1991)).
201. The State argued this as a statement against the declarant, Jeffery Farina's, penal
interest under section 90.804(2)(c). However, the statement implicated his brother and codefendant, Anthony Farina. The statement, in and of itself, against Jeffery Farina would
clearly be an admission of a party opponent, since Jeffery Farina was a party. See FLA. STAT. §
90.803(18) (1995). Therefore, the statement would be admissible against Jeffery as an
admission under section 90.803(18). The State apparently argued for entry of the statement
against Anthony under section 90.804(2)(c), in an attempt to avoid a violation of the
Confrontation Clause. A firmly rooted hearsay exception generally does not violate Confrontation Clause principles. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. A declaration against penal interest (with
facts similar to the Farinacase) which fits within the hearsay exception should be considered
firmly rooted. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 551 (1986) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated that these statements are less reliable
than ordinary hearsay because of a co-defendant's strong motivation to implicate the other
defendant and to exonerate himself. Id. at 541. The Supreme Court of Florida followed this
dictate and indicated that confrontation issues will arise when a co-defendant's statement
against penal interest incriminates another defendant in a joint trial. Farina, 21 Fla. L.
Weekly at S177. Statements and confessions made by co-defendants which implicate the
other defendants in a joint trial are considered presumptively unreliable because of the strong
incentive to throw the blame on the accomplice.
202. Generally, section 90.804 is used when the declarant is an unavailable non-party
witness. Here, the declarant was a party. It is uncertain if the State felt that admission under
section 90.804(2)(c) would automatically resolve the confrontation problem against the
defendant, Anthony Farina, since the statement here was inherently reliable, given the facts of
this case and, therefore, no further showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
would be needed.
Prior to 1990, the FloridaEvidence Code contained the following language: "A statement
or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and which is made by a
co-defendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this
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Court has ruled that the presumption of unreliability that attaches to a codefendant's confession or statement may be rebutted where there is a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.2 °3
The supreme court, in examining the facts of Farina, found that the
24
"indicia of reliability" existed to rebut the presumption of unreliability. 0
The supreme court found that neither brother had an incentive to shift the
blame during the conversations, as these were not statements or confessions
to the police. 20 5 Both brothers were calmly discussing the crime in the back
of the police car. Unbeknownst to them, they were being taped. Since
neither was aware that the conversations were being taped, it was unlikely
that the motivation for fabrication was present. The court felt that Anthony
was present and confronting his brother face-to-face throughout the conversations. 206 Anthony could have taken issue with what was said during this
conversation; however, this did not occur. The brothers tacitly agreed on
what was being said and discussed details of the crime. This is different
from the situation where a confession from one co-defendant has been taken
by the police. The other co-defendant in this situation is not confronting the
confessor and the confessing defendant has an incentive to shift the blame to
his partner in crime. The supreme court determined that the taped conversations were admissible, since there was a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 2 07 Therefore, the court held that a confrontation
violation did not exist and the statement was properly admitted under section
90.804(2)(c). 2 8
IX. AUTHENTICATION
Mills v. Barker2°9 was one of the only cases during the survey period to
discuss authentication and self-authentication under the Florida Evidence

exception." The import of this language was to clearly remove section 90.804(2)(c) from
being the possible entry point of hearsay evidence against a codefendant in a joint trial. This
was in an apparent attempt to codify Bruton. However, this language was deleted in 1990
because it was felt that this sentence may have broadened the impact of Bruton, by excluding
evidence not specified by that decision.

203. Lee, 476 U.S. at 543.
204. Farina,21 Fla L. Weekly at S178.
205. Id

206. Id.
207. Id

208. Id.
209. 664 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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The issue in Mills was whether a modification agreement, 211
signed and notarized, was properly authenticated for admission during a
replevin action in a Florida circuit court.2 t2 The circuit court excluded the
agreement on the grounds that the document could not be properly authenticated. The district court reversed and held that although the document could
not be authenticated by extrinsic evidence, the document was selfauthenticating and therefore, admissible. 3
Before evidence can be admitted at a trial or at a hearing, it must first be
identified or authenticated.21 4 Section 90.901 of the Florida Statutes
provides that "[a]uthentication or identification of evidence is required as a
condition precedent to its admissibility. The requirements of this section are
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims. 2 15
Evidence may be authenticated by the testimony of a witness who has
personal knowledge of facts which are sufficient to authenticate the evidence. It has long been held that a witness may testify about having seen the
writer sign his or her name on several occasions and is able to identify the
writer's signature.216 This is what happened in Mills. The proponent of the
agreement, Mr. Mills, testified regarding the authentication of the modification agreement. Although Mr. Mills identified two of the signatures on the
agreement, he could not properly identify the third signature purporting to be
that of a Mr. Orland. Mr. Mills had never seen Mr. Orland affix his signature to any document, even though he had seen a signature which was
purported to be Mr. Orland's on more than one occasion. Therefore, the
district court ruled that Mr. Mills testimony was insufficient to authenticate
the modification agreement under section 90.901.217
Although extrinsic testimony may not be sufficient to authenticate a
document, the document may be admissible if is self-authenticating under
Code.2 10

210. Id.at 1057.
211. The agreement was acknowledged by all parties to be governed by the law of California. Id. at 1056.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1057.
214. Even if the evidence has been authenticated, it is not automatically admitted into
evidence. If an exclusionary rule excludes the evidence, the evidence is inadmissible. See
United States v. One 1968 Piper Navajo Twin Engine Aircraft, 594 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a certain authenticated document should be excluded as hearsay).
215. FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (1995).
216. See Pittman v. State, 41 So. 385, 393 (Fla. 1906).
217. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057.
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section 90.902.218 There are a number of exceptions to the requirement of
using extrinsic evidence to prove a document is authentic.2 19 When there is
sufficient information contained in the document to meet one of these
exceptions, the document is self-authenticating. The document proves itself
and is admissible without further proof of extrinsic evidence.
In Mills, the district court found that the document was selfauthenticating and admissible. 220 The district court determined that the
modification agreement was self-authenticating under section 90.902(9).221
The district court read this in conjunction with section 92.50(2), which
provides that a notary public and certain judicial officers may administer
oaths and acknowledgments. 22 The certificate of the notary public is
presumptive evidence that the person appeared before the notary and
acknowledged the execution of the document.2 23 In the Mills case, the
signatures were acknowledged by a notary public, who signed the modification agreement and attached his seal. Since the signatures were acknowledged by a notary public, and the legislature has declared that a document
that is acknowledged by a notary public is presumptively authentic and
genuine, the modification agreement
was self-authenticating and should have
224
been admitted into evidence.
The district court also examined the necessity of proving that the notary
public who signed the agreement was, in fact, a notary. 225 The district court
dismissed this by explaining that unless a statute specifically requires
evidence of official character to accompany the official act which it authorizes, no additional proof is needed.226 In fact, extrinsic proof of the fact that

218. FLA. STAT. § 90.902 (1995). This section states that extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required for documents falling under any of
the ten enumerated exceptions listed in this rule. Id.
219. Id. § 90.902(1)-(10).
220. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057.
221. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 90.902(9). This section reads in part: "Extrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required for ... [a]ny signature,
document, or other matter declared by the Legislature to be presumptively or prima facie
genuine or authentic." Id.
222. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057 (citing FLA. STAT. § 92.50(2) (1995)).
223. Id. See also Mills v. Hamilton, 163 So. 857 (Fla. 1935).
224. The side opposing the admission of a self-authenticating document can still attack
the genuineness of the document; however, the document is admissible subject to the weight
the jury intends to give it. See Sunnyvale Maritime Co. v. Gomez, 546 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
225. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057-58.
226. Id. at 1058.
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the notary was, in fact, a notary would destroy the whole premise behind
self-authenticating documents, which is that no other extrinsic proof is
needed to prove that the document is genuine. Since the document itself
provides sufficient information to be admitted without further proof of its
genuineness, any additional extrinsic evidence is redundant and unnecessary.
X. ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE

During the survey period, the Florida Legislature made very few
changes to the FloridaEvidence Code. Although the new code sections bear
directly on the admissibility of evidence at trial, no major changes were
forthcoming this year.

A. Admissibility of Paternity Determinations in Certain Criminal
Prosecutions
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature created section
90.4025 of the Florida Statutes, which deals with the admissibility of
paternity evidence in a criminal prosecution.22 7 In criminal prosecutions for
sexual battery and child abuse, evidence of the paternity of the child will be
admissible under this section. This new evidence section will facilitate the
prosecution in establishing the identity of the offender.

B. Prohibition Against a Prisoner Submitting Nondocumentary
PhysicalEvidence Without Authorization of the Court
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature created section 92.351
of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits prisoners from submitting nondocumentary evidence to the trial court without its authorization.228

227. Ch. 96-215, § 8, 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 575, 579 (West) (creating FLA. STAT. §
90.4025 (1996)). This section reads as follows: "If a person less than 18 years of age gives
birth to a child and the paternity of that child is established under chapter 742, such evidence
of paternity is admissible in a criminal prosecution under s. 794.011, s. 794.05, s. 800.04, and
s. 827.04(4)." Id.
228. Ch. 96-106, § 3, 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 72, 74 (West) (creating FLA. STAT. §
92.351 (1996)). This section provides:
(1) No prisoner as defined by s. 57.085 who is a party to a judicial proceeding may submit evidence or any other item that is not in paper document form to
a court or clerk of court without first obtaining authorization from the court.
This prohibition includes, but is not limited to, all nondocumentary evidence or
items offered in support of a motion, pleading, or other document filed with the
court. This prohibition does not preclude a prisoner who is appearing in person
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XI. CONCLUSION
A trial is a search for the truth. The evidence code facilitates that
search by allowing only trustworthy and reliable evidence to be presented to
the fact finder for a resolution of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida's
guidelines regarding the admissibility of DNA evidence will promote that
search for the truth, by allowing only DNA evidence that has met certain
guidelines into evidence. This will be especially beneficial to prosecutors
and defense attorneys who prepare for DNA evidentiary issues. In contrast,
the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling on prior inconsistent statements used
in criminal cases may invariably obscure that search. Although this ruling
will not affect how the attorneys will question witnesses during discovery
depositions, it may well affect how prosecutors and defense attorneys
approach discovery depositions, if they feel there is a chance a witness may
later change his or her story. Finally, the question of the admissibility of
child abuse profiles is sure to reach the Supreme Court of Florida during the
coming year. Hopefully, the court's analysis will facilitate trial attorneys in
their never-ending search for truth and justice in our complex legal system.

or through counsel before a court at a trial or hearing from submitting physical
evidence to the court at the appropriate time.
(2) A corrections or detention facility for prisoner may conduct a cursory examination of the outside of any package or other mailing from a prisoner to a
court or clerk of court of this state to determine whether the package or mailing
contains materials other than paper documents. If such package or mailing appears to contain materials other than paper documents, the facility shall refuse to
forward it until the sender presents a court order authorizing the mailing of such
nondocumentary items or demonstrates that the contents are not prohibited by
this section.
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